In Kuhn’s final chapter of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he writes, “…the unit of scientific achievement is the solved problem,” (169). For a human society in which discovery and understanding the world is highly valued, it makes sense that Kuhn boils scientific achievement down to the very thing humans crave the most—answers and resolutions.
Humans are not happy to situate themselves in a world where things are uncertain. Whether the explanation of life is scientifically-based or spiritually-based, the answer to the origin of life explains the very nature of human existence. Were we created? Have we morphed over billions of years? Creationists say yes to the first, and evolutionists say yes to the latter. Either way, it seems that the point of each theory is to grant some truth to human life.
Scientists are quick to denote that creationism is not a part of science—this is ultimately supportable because science is rooted in hypothesis, experiment, and evidence, which cannot be done regarding the theory of creationism. However, the theory of evolution is also not testable. It is, though, able to be witnessed over a long period of time and noted through the examination of fossils.
What Kuhn found to be most revolutionary about Darwin’s theory of natural selection and evolution was its inference that science has no ultimate goal. He writes, “But nothing that has been or will be said makes [science] a process of evolution toward anything,” (170). In other words, because evolution distinguishes that there is no definitive existence of any living thing, it also infers that there is no ultimate end goal to science.
With this in mind, I read “Backward, Christian Soldiers!” by Kurt Andersen from New York Magazine’s website. He writes vigilantly against the implementation of intelligent design being taught in schools, and on the second page of his rant he writes, “In science, there is no such thing as fixed, irrefutable truth. That’s the difference between empiricism and faith.”
There is something assuming in that statement, though. If science is not rooted on a fixed, irrefutable truth, why is it truth that creationism is ultimately wrong? While I myself do not find creationism to be a scientific theory which should be taught in science class, it seems definitely worthy of being considered in a humanities course as a means of explaining human life. If science prides itself in promoting an environment without truth, it should be all the more ready to support the discussion of intelligent design. There is, after all, no ultimate fact battling its validity. For many Christians, evolution is as much fact as creationism.
And if science is a process in which humans attempt to explain the world, why is religion so easy to chastise? Is it not equally a means of explaining human life? And even if it was created by humans, was not also science created in the hands of humans? Are not numbers an invention of the human brain? Language? Concepts? Time? These are all measurements of human understanding.
Reading Andersen’s piece I became angry for creationism because he described it as “believing in magic.” Wizardry, fairytales, and alchemy have been proven as incorrect explanations of the world. Religion itself has evolved—no longer do people believe in Zeus. This parallels science in that people do not believe the earth to be the center of the universe any longer. It is not fair to discount faith as a means of rationalization because of what was once believed; archaic scientific explanations are equally as ridiculous.
Not one person ultimately knows what is and what is not on such large terms. Kuhn saw this too, writing, “The Origin of Species recognized no goal set by God or nature,” (172). He goes on to end his work with the following: “Any conception of nature compatible with the growth of science by proof is compatible with the evolutionary view of science developed here. Since this view is also compatible with close observation of scientific life, there are strong arguments for employing it in attempts to solve the host of problems which still remain,” (173). Arguably, there is no ultimate answer to how humans came to be and where they are going.
Why close the mind to a rational possibility?
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/columns/imperialcity/14721/
“Backward, Christian Soldiers!”
Kurt Andersen
New York Magazine Website
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas S. Kuhn
Chicago University Press
Chicago, Illinois and London, England
1962, 1970, 1996
Thursday, May 3, 2007
Contemporary Modalities: Abstinence Study Statistics
In bolded letters, a pull quote in Sharon Begley’s column titled “Just say No—to Bad Science” from Newsweek May 7, 2007, reads, “No one is saying that researchers cheat, but how they design a study of sex education can practically preordain the results.” Immediately, I thought of Latour’s chapter on modalities in Science in Action. Modalities, in Latour’s terms, are statements which “modify (or qualify) another one,” (22).
Latour describes instances in which facts are distorted by the phrasing of arguments and perspectives. Similarly, Begley criticizes factual distortion. She writes, “Choosing the wrong methodology can lead science, and the public, astray.” Begley went on to criticize a number of studies done on abstinence programs in teens due to the conditions and biases involved.
For instance, Begley wrote, “Many evaluated programs where kids take a virginity pledge. But kids who choose to pledge are arguably different from kids who spurn the idea.” She infers here that the study following those who took a pledge is incomplete because it does not follow all teenage sexual choice. It only looked at the way children who pledged their virginity behaved.
She also attacked a study based on memory and abstinence. She states, “…up to half of kids forget whether they took a virginity pledge, or pretend they never did….Both factors inflate the measured efficacy of pledge programs.”
Depending on the way the information of these studies is presented the studies seem to be more or less effective. Latour uses examples in his text to demonstrate the peculiar means of tinting fact. On page 22, Latour elaborates on this:
“What happens when someone disbelieves a sentence? Let me experiment with three simple cases.
(1) New soviet missiles aimed against Minutemen silos are accurate to 100 metres.
(2) Since [new Soviet missiles are accurate within 100 metres] this means that Minutemen are not safe any more, and this is the main reason why the MX weapon system is necessary.
(3) Advocates of the MX in the Pentagon cleverly leak information contending that [new Soviet missiles are accurate within 100 metres].”
Latour then describes these 3 sentences by stating that (1) is the initial fact, (2) is a positive modality in that it uses (1) to push an idea, and (3) is a negative modality because it refutes (1)’s validity.
In this way, one can set up a code of modalities related to Begley’s article:
(1) Abstinence studies of children who took virginity pledges show that pledges are “effective in reducing early sexual activity.”
(2) Because [abstinence studies of children who took virginity pledges show that pledges are “effective in reducing early sexual activity”] this means that virginity pledges prevent teenage sexual behavior, and this is the reason all children should take virginity pledges.
(3) Conservatives cleverly use [abstinence studies of children who took virginity pledges] to push conservative ideals despite the fact that the studies were incomplete.
Overall, modalities seem to boil facts so that they seem flimsy and plump, unable to stand on their own. Perhaps Begley said it best when she ended her article with the following line: “Authors of the problematic studies say they did the best they could with the time and money they had. OK, but as Trenholm says, “there is such a thing as good science and less good science.” And you can really tell the difference.” In this way, as the American public, we should be wary of science done under motivation. The existence of biased science makes it our duty to sift through the opinion for the fact.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
“Just Say No—To Bad Science”
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
May 7, 2007
Science in Action
Bruno Latour
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
1987
Latour describes instances in which facts are distorted by the phrasing of arguments and perspectives. Similarly, Begley criticizes factual distortion. She writes, “Choosing the wrong methodology can lead science, and the public, astray.” Begley went on to criticize a number of studies done on abstinence programs in teens due to the conditions and biases involved.
For instance, Begley wrote, “Many evaluated programs where kids take a virginity pledge. But kids who choose to pledge are arguably different from kids who spurn the idea.” She infers here that the study following those who took a pledge is incomplete because it does not follow all teenage sexual choice. It only looked at the way children who pledged their virginity behaved.
She also attacked a study based on memory and abstinence. She states, “…up to half of kids forget whether they took a virginity pledge, or pretend they never did….Both factors inflate the measured efficacy of pledge programs.”
Depending on the way the information of these studies is presented the studies seem to be more or less effective. Latour uses examples in his text to demonstrate the peculiar means of tinting fact. On page 22, Latour elaborates on this:
“What happens when someone disbelieves a sentence? Let me experiment with three simple cases.
(1) New soviet missiles aimed against Minutemen silos are accurate to 100 metres.
(2) Since [new Soviet missiles are accurate within 100 metres] this means that Minutemen are not safe any more, and this is the main reason why the MX weapon system is necessary.
(3) Advocates of the MX in the Pentagon cleverly leak information contending that [new Soviet missiles are accurate within 100 metres].”
Latour then describes these 3 sentences by stating that (1) is the initial fact, (2) is a positive modality in that it uses (1) to push an idea, and (3) is a negative modality because it refutes (1)’s validity.
In this way, one can set up a code of modalities related to Begley’s article:
(1) Abstinence studies of children who took virginity pledges show that pledges are “effective in reducing early sexual activity.”
(2) Because [abstinence studies of children who took virginity pledges show that pledges are “effective in reducing early sexual activity”] this means that virginity pledges prevent teenage sexual behavior, and this is the reason all children should take virginity pledges.
(3) Conservatives cleverly use [abstinence studies of children who took virginity pledges] to push conservative ideals despite the fact that the studies were incomplete.
Overall, modalities seem to boil facts so that they seem flimsy and plump, unable to stand on their own. Perhaps Begley said it best when she ended her article with the following line: “Authors of the problematic studies say they did the best they could with the time and money they had. OK, but as Trenholm says, “there is such a thing as good science and less good science.” And you can really tell the difference.” In this way, as the American public, we should be wary of science done under motivation. The existence of biased science makes it our duty to sift through the opinion for the fact.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
“Just Say No—To Bad Science”
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
May 7, 2007
Science in Action
Bruno Latour
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
1987
Thursday, April 26, 2007
Global Warming: Beyond the Paradigm
In Gregg Easterbrook’s article “Global Warming: Who Loses—And Who Wins?” from the April publication of The Atlantic Monthly, he presents the considerable interconnections between science and everyday life. He writes, “Economic change means winners as well as losers. Huge sums will be made and lost if the global climate changes. Everyone wonders what warming might do to the environment—but what might it do to the global distribution of money and power?”
Easterbrook’s questions are relevant and terrifying, and they lead me to consider the challenges of a changing world in terms of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Sure, it is hard to fight a crisis in thought, and it is difficult to stomach an idealistic revolution, but is it not harder to witness a paradigmatic crisis directly related to reality?
The earth is changing, and depending on who one talks to, the timing of this change is different. What is certain though, is that the environment is in some sort of crisis. I relate it to a paradigmatic crisis in that Kuhn explains the situation by stating, “The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and each other,” (77). Whereas scientists have a choice to accept a theory or reject it in the eyes of current thought, there is no choice in facing global emergency. Because there is no choice involved, a crisis of reality seems to be more dangerous than a crisis of ideology.
However, what is even more dangerous about this crisis of reality is that there is still ideology involved. Certain governmental figures in the United States choose not to address the issue of global warming or they do not recognize its validity. Instead of treating it as an irrefutable crisis needing to be dealt with, they treat it as a paradigmatic crisis. While Kuhn states on page 79 that "there is no such thing as research without counterinstances," it is hard to argue that the glaciers in Greenland are melting. Then again, Kuhn also states that "science students accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, not because of evidence," (80). Perhaps not enough scientists have united to form a unit of authority on the issue.
To me, who loses and who wins in terms of global warming is not something involving global distribution and power. It involves the substantiation and preservation of life at this point. How can anyone consider the political implications of this factor if the factor has not even been completely addressed? For now, until the government chooses to recognize global warming beyond a paradigmatic crisis, we all lose.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200704/global-warming
“Global Warming: Who Wins—And Who Loses?”
Gregg Easterbrook
The Atlantic Monthly
April 2007
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas S. Kuhn
Chicago University Press
Chicago, Illinois and London, England
1962, 1970, 1996
Easterbrook’s questions are relevant and terrifying, and they lead me to consider the challenges of a changing world in terms of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Sure, it is hard to fight a crisis in thought, and it is difficult to stomach an idealistic revolution, but is it not harder to witness a paradigmatic crisis directly related to reality?
The earth is changing, and depending on who one talks to, the timing of this change is different. What is certain though, is that the environment is in some sort of crisis. I relate it to a paradigmatic crisis in that Kuhn explains the situation by stating, “The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and each other,” (77). Whereas scientists have a choice to accept a theory or reject it in the eyes of current thought, there is no choice in facing global emergency. Because there is no choice involved, a crisis of reality seems to be more dangerous than a crisis of ideology.
However, what is even more dangerous about this crisis of reality is that there is still ideology involved. Certain governmental figures in the United States choose not to address the issue of global warming or they do not recognize its validity. Instead of treating it as an irrefutable crisis needing to be dealt with, they treat it as a paradigmatic crisis. While Kuhn states on page 79 that "there is no such thing as research without counterinstances," it is hard to argue that the glaciers in Greenland are melting. Then again, Kuhn also states that "science students accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, not because of evidence," (80). Perhaps not enough scientists have united to form a unit of authority on the issue.
To me, who loses and who wins in terms of global warming is not something involving global distribution and power. It involves the substantiation and preservation of life at this point. How can anyone consider the political implications of this factor if the factor has not even been completely addressed? For now, until the government chooses to recognize global warming beyond a paradigmatic crisis, we all lose.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200704/global-warming
“Global Warming: Who Wins—And Who Loses?”
Gregg Easterbrook
The Atlantic Monthly
April 2007
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas S. Kuhn
Chicago University Press
Chicago, Illinois and London, England
1962, 1970, 1996
Locke, Garfinkel, Reason-- Shoot!
Living in America, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is more than just a reading in political philosophy and societal design. It is the hallmark of free market capitalism. Though marked with critique, the Treatise is a stark, obvious document, with clear rationale and an irrefutable use of Enlightenment reason.
Though the time of the Enlightenment has passed, Locke’s premise for economic distribution is still a hot button issue. By examining Alan Garfinkel’s commentary on Locke in Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory, the solidity of Locke’s rationale is illustrated, and it is in this flaw of Garfinkel’s Marxist critique that the importance of his own thoughts on questioning and explanation can be recognized.
Most importantly, Locke begins the Second Treatise of Government with the dissolution of manifest power. He states, “Firstly. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, nor the dominion over the world, as is pretended,” (Locke, 3). This is important when contemplating Lockean theory in contemporary society; Locke does not avow inheritance. He does not tolerate inactivity.
Instead, as he explains in his section on the state of nature, Locke supports attainment through labor. By following the law of nature—not to steal, kill, or enslave another man—one finds peace in the state of nature. If one breaks this law, both parties, the stolen from and the stealing, enter into the state of war, and it is up to the person affronted to punish (4-5).
This follows in Nozick’s notation of the Lockean proviso, that as one labors the land for ownership, there must still be, “as much and as good left in common for others,” (Garfinkel, 81). In the case of the state of nature, taking more than you are able to labor or seizing the worked land of another is stealing. Locke does not condone the breaking of this law, and it is up to each individual in the state of nature to abide by this standard and to enforce it when necessary.
Garfinkel's critique of Locke is not based on Lockean thought, but on modern capitalist society. He begins his argument by refuting the Lockean proviso, Garfinkel states, “If someone’s appropriation of something ends up depriving others in any way, the theory collapses and has nothing to say about possible entitlements,” (81). This critique is problematic because it neglects the cultural presuppositions which have constructed a society where deprivation is permitted.
Garfinkel continues, "If we look at history, we can see why. There is not a shred of hope of applying this original entitlement scheme in any real case," (82). While Garfinkel is free to say that Locke's proviso is based on fantasy because most entitlement is derived from conquest, Locke did not condone that conquest. He asked for a societal structure and a property distribution in which his entitlement scheme worked under governmental supervision. Critiquing Locke for a fantastical societal proposal is the same as calling Marx's wish for a classless society fictitious. The problem with communism is not its plan, but in its application-- human corruption. The same is with Locke. Theoretically, both Marx and Locke are relatively flawless.
Secondly, the actions which Garfinkel associates with Locke are not actions which Locke would avow. Garfinkel distinguishes the faults of American capitalism as having to do with Locke: "Any good history tells the same story about the people who amassed the fortunes of the great families in the United States. John D. Rockefeller had competitors dynamited, Ford had striking workers shot," (83). In civil society, Locke would expect the government to address these violations of his proviso. It does not make his proviso invalid; it makes the American government invalid in its application of Lockean theory. In his description of civil society, Locke describes the specific purpose as to protect the individual rights of others. Locke's government would prosecute Rockefeller. Ford would also have been punished. Lockean theory is only fantastical because the government has not acted as Locke suggests.
However, in Lockean civil society, Locke still does not allow for the stealing of one’s labored land. By joining the commonwealth, each and every member gives up some rights for protection under the government. Specifically, Locke notes the protection of property by joining a commonwealth: “…government has no other end but the preservation of property…” (Locke, 34). In fact, Locke offers a clause to identify just when it is fair to seize property from someone. He reasons, “the supreme power cannot take away from any man any part of his property without his own consent,” (49), and as such, it will be the government’s duty to be sure that the Lockean proviso is sustained in civil matters and in governmental behavior. Unless one consents for something to be taken away, it must not be seized.
In fact, if the Lockean proviso is not abided by, Locke calls for revolution. This is sensibly so, too, for Locke is so concerned with property, that if he allowed for an unrighteous seizing of it, his most beloved entity of human existence would be violated. He reasons:
“The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end while they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to properties of all the society….Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society…it devolves to the people, who have the right to assume their original liberty…” (60).
It becomes clear then that Locke is not passive in his defense of the right of property for each and every member of civil society. Because of Locke’s entitlement theory, he obligates all to work for property, but he never allows for the unrighteous seizure of earned property.
It is in Locke’s well-developed concept of property importance that Garfinkel is beaten at his own game of explanation. However, Garfinkel is right to be concerned with the modern application of Lockean theory for it often neglects Locke’s ultimate concern for governmental protection of property—“one’s life, liberty, and estate,” (31). The Rockefellers and the Fords of America do need to be addressed. It is perhaps that Garfinkel has not looked at the structural presuppositions that have allowed the straying from Lockean principles into modern capitalist mannerisms. He should not attack Locke for his concept, but America for disallowing its application.
If Garfinkel were to broaden his perspective by examining applications, societal demands, and current economic structures internally and externally, etc., Garfinkel could possibly find the exact explanatory framework to point fingers. As for now, he has fallen short. The Lockean proviso is not inadequate because of itself, but because of its inability to be enforced in the American contrast space.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
The Second Treatise of Government
from The Temple University Intellectual Heritage 52 Reader
John Locke
Temple University Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
2004
Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Alan Garfinkel
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut and London, England
1981
Though the time of the Enlightenment has passed, Locke’s premise for economic distribution is still a hot button issue. By examining Alan Garfinkel’s commentary on Locke in Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory, the solidity of Locke’s rationale is illustrated, and it is in this flaw of Garfinkel’s Marxist critique that the importance of his own thoughts on questioning and explanation can be recognized.
Most importantly, Locke begins the Second Treatise of Government with the dissolution of manifest power. He states, “Firstly. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, nor the dominion over the world, as is pretended,” (Locke, 3). This is important when contemplating Lockean theory in contemporary society; Locke does not avow inheritance. He does not tolerate inactivity.
Instead, as he explains in his section on the state of nature, Locke supports attainment through labor. By following the law of nature—not to steal, kill, or enslave another man—one finds peace in the state of nature. If one breaks this law, both parties, the stolen from and the stealing, enter into the state of war, and it is up to the person affronted to punish (4-5).
This follows in Nozick’s notation of the Lockean proviso, that as one labors the land for ownership, there must still be, “as much and as good left in common for others,” (Garfinkel, 81). In the case of the state of nature, taking more than you are able to labor or seizing the worked land of another is stealing. Locke does not condone the breaking of this law, and it is up to each individual in the state of nature to abide by this standard and to enforce it when necessary.
Garfinkel's critique of Locke is not based on Lockean thought, but on modern capitalist society. He begins his argument by refuting the Lockean proviso, Garfinkel states, “If someone’s appropriation of something ends up depriving others in any way, the theory collapses and has nothing to say about possible entitlements,” (81). This critique is problematic because it neglects the cultural presuppositions which have constructed a society where deprivation is permitted.
Garfinkel continues, "If we look at history, we can see why. There is not a shred of hope of applying this original entitlement scheme in any real case," (82). While Garfinkel is free to say that Locke's proviso is based on fantasy because most entitlement is derived from conquest, Locke did not condone that conquest. He asked for a societal structure and a property distribution in which his entitlement scheme worked under governmental supervision. Critiquing Locke for a fantastical societal proposal is the same as calling Marx's wish for a classless society fictitious. The problem with communism is not its plan, but in its application-- human corruption. The same is with Locke. Theoretically, both Marx and Locke are relatively flawless.
Secondly, the actions which Garfinkel associates with Locke are not actions which Locke would avow. Garfinkel distinguishes the faults of American capitalism as having to do with Locke: "Any good history tells the same story about the people who amassed the fortunes of the great families in the United States. John D. Rockefeller had competitors dynamited, Ford had striking workers shot," (83). In civil society, Locke would expect the government to address these violations of his proviso. It does not make his proviso invalid; it makes the American government invalid in its application of Lockean theory. In his description of civil society, Locke describes the specific purpose as to protect the individual rights of others. Locke's government would prosecute Rockefeller. Ford would also have been punished. Lockean theory is only fantastical because the government has not acted as Locke suggests.
However, in Lockean civil society, Locke still does not allow for the stealing of one’s labored land. By joining the commonwealth, each and every member gives up some rights for protection under the government. Specifically, Locke notes the protection of property by joining a commonwealth: “…government has no other end but the preservation of property…” (Locke, 34). In fact, Locke offers a clause to identify just when it is fair to seize property from someone. He reasons, “the supreme power cannot take away from any man any part of his property without his own consent,” (49), and as such, it will be the government’s duty to be sure that the Lockean proviso is sustained in civil matters and in governmental behavior. Unless one consents for something to be taken away, it must not be seized.
In fact, if the Lockean proviso is not abided by, Locke calls for revolution. This is sensibly so, too, for Locke is so concerned with property, that if he allowed for an unrighteous seizing of it, his most beloved entity of human existence would be violated. He reasons:
“The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end while they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to properties of all the society….Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society…it devolves to the people, who have the right to assume their original liberty…” (60).
It becomes clear then that Locke is not passive in his defense of the right of property for each and every member of civil society. Because of Locke’s entitlement theory, he obligates all to work for property, but he never allows for the unrighteous seizure of earned property.
It is in Locke’s well-developed concept of property importance that Garfinkel is beaten at his own game of explanation. However, Garfinkel is right to be concerned with the modern application of Lockean theory for it often neglects Locke’s ultimate concern for governmental protection of property—“one’s life, liberty, and estate,” (31). The Rockefellers and the Fords of America do need to be addressed. It is perhaps that Garfinkel has not looked at the structural presuppositions that have allowed the straying from Lockean principles into modern capitalist mannerisms. He should not attack Locke for his concept, but America for disallowing its application.
If Garfinkel were to broaden his perspective by examining applications, societal demands, and current economic structures internally and externally, etc., Garfinkel could possibly find the exact explanatory framework to point fingers. As for now, he has fallen short. The Lockean proviso is not inadequate because of itself, but because of its inability to be enforced in the American contrast space.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
The Second Treatise of Government
from The Temple University Intellectual Heritage 52 Reader
John Locke
Temple University Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
2004
Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Alan Garfinkel
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut and London, England
1981
SHIFT: Gleise 581c
Science is marked in its ability to morph through progress. As the collective revision of human understanding, it is marked by what is known and what is not known.
A news release on Outside Magazine’s website today, April 26, 2007, described just such an unexpected and unprecedented discovery: Scientists have identified the first planet other than earth ever to be labeled as habitable.
Gleise 581c, as the scientists from Switzerland, France, and Portugal have named it, has an estimated temperature range of 32-104 degrees Fahrenheit, making it possible for liquid water’s presence. While the planet is 14 times closer to its sun than earth is to its counterpart, Gleise 581c’s sun is a red dwarf, which is a lot less powerful than earth’s sun. According to these statistics, this planet could have the climate of planet earth.
And there, in an announcement so blunt, a Kuhnian scientific crisis officially presents itself in that it presents an anomaly as "a particularly effective way of inducing paradigm change," (52). While many may have not expected the discovery of possible life (as we know it) conditions to be discovered on another planet in their life time, it will be equally as hard for scientists to send a space mission almost 20.5 light years away from earth any time soon. The process of this investigation is slow, but the process of investigation now seems warranted in the anomaly such as a habitable planet.
In the terms of Kuhn, the possibility of extraterrestrial life is now part of the paradigm of normal science because its questionable existence is now specifically part of the process. Life on other planets is now not just imagined or discussed, but is a valid, researchable topic.
Discoveries such as the one of Gleise 581c are a reminder that Possibility exists, and that it is the slow process and prodding of science that can distinguish the impossible from the Possible.
Outside Online read, "We are confident,” Michel Mayor of Geneva University said in a statement, “that, given the results obtained so far, finding a planet with the mass of the Earth around a red dwarf is within reach."
Humans must be confident that the answer will come, one black box at a time.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
http://outside.away.com/outside/news/20070426_01.html
First Habitable Planet Discovered
Outside Online
April 26, 2007
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas S. Kuhn
Chicago University Press
Chicago, Illinois and London, England
1962, 1970, 1996
A news release on Outside Magazine’s website today, April 26, 2007, described just such an unexpected and unprecedented discovery: Scientists have identified the first planet other than earth ever to be labeled as habitable.
Gleise 581c, as the scientists from Switzerland, France, and Portugal have named it, has an estimated temperature range of 32-104 degrees Fahrenheit, making it possible for liquid water’s presence. While the planet is 14 times closer to its sun than earth is to its counterpart, Gleise 581c’s sun is a red dwarf, which is a lot less powerful than earth’s sun. According to these statistics, this planet could have the climate of planet earth.
And there, in an announcement so blunt, a Kuhnian scientific crisis officially presents itself in that it presents an anomaly as "a particularly effective way of inducing paradigm change," (52). While many may have not expected the discovery of possible life (as we know it) conditions to be discovered on another planet in their life time, it will be equally as hard for scientists to send a space mission almost 20.5 light years away from earth any time soon. The process of this investigation is slow, but the process of investigation now seems warranted in the anomaly such as a habitable planet.
In the terms of Kuhn, the possibility of extraterrestrial life is now part of the paradigm of normal science because its questionable existence is now specifically part of the process. Life on other planets is now not just imagined or discussed, but is a valid, researchable topic.
Discoveries such as the one of Gleise 581c are a reminder that Possibility exists, and that it is the slow process and prodding of science that can distinguish the impossible from the Possible.
Outside Online read, "We are confident,” Michel Mayor of Geneva University said in a statement, “that, given the results obtained so far, finding a planet with the mass of the Earth around a red dwarf is within reach."
Humans must be confident that the answer will come, one black box at a time.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
http://outside.away.com/outside/news/20070426_01.html
First Habitable Planet Discovered
Outside Online
April 26, 2007
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas S. Kuhn
Chicago University Press
Chicago, Illinois and London, England
1962, 1970, 1996
Wednesday, April 25, 2007
Resemblance in Genetic Engineering
Foucault, in The Order of Things, depicts the Classical period by its labeling of things based on sight, on appearance, on similarity—resemblance. He chastises the foolishness of linking, say, a walnut to curing a head wound based on the shape and appearance of both the head and walnut (27). However beautiful Foucault’s description of the similitudes (analogy, emulation, sympathy, and convenience), these descriptions fail to suffice in scientific explanation, order, and structure. Foucault notes this as the weak point of Classical thought.
So why is it, that now, in some sort of age beyond resemblance—perhaps representation, perhaps not— an article in a magazine has to discuss something like Genetic Engineering, a process which creates children in the image or likeness of something else? Have humans not moved beyond the age of resemblance? It seems humans have not, and while this is not shocking to Foucault, who characterized the shift from episteme to episteme with a sort of awareness of all preexisting historical memoir, it is somewhat shocking to see just how resemblance has appeared in contemporary culture.
Bill McKibben explained the process of Genetic Engineering in his article, “Designer Genes” for Orion Magazine, and within it, he illuminated the harsh reality of what genetic engineering instigates. Through genetic engineering, parents decide what traits a child should have-- what person they should resemble, what ways of being they should emulate. Whereas humans before used resemblance to understand what is going on in the world, humans now are using resemblance to control what is going on in the world. It is in this use of control that resemblance is so controversial concerning genetic enginnering. McKibben writes:
“The vision of genetic engineers is to do to humans what we have already done to salmon and wheat, pine trees and tomatoes. That is, to make them better in some way; to delete, modify, or add genes in developing embryos so that the cells of the resulting person will produce proteins that make them taller and more muscular, or smarter and less aggressive, maybe handsome and possibly straight. Even happy. As early as 1993, a March of Dimes poll found that forty- three percent of Americans would engage in genetic engineering “simply to enhance their children’s looks or intelligence.””
Those that can genetically alter their child are able to create a human as an amalgam of favorite physical and mental traits so as to emulate a conceived vision of the ultimate child. Because of this unnatural a la carte style conception, it is hard to accept genetic engineering as a natural part of science.
Being frustrated with genetic engineering for its eerie God-like simulation is not the point, though. What is important is the fact that humans continue to live their lives with the similitudes now in an active manner. Specifically, emulation and convenience can be noted. For instance, a child may emulate a specific physical characteristic of a parent based upon the selection of a gene. For convenience sake, a child may be given a gene credited to ivy league students. While a gene may not cause a person to succeed or be beautiful, it may lay the groundwork for these things to occur.
By genetically altering a child, a parent is able to choose what that child emulates and creates a connection “without…proxmity,” (19). In this way, the child could be the mirror (21) of whoever the mother or father selects. For convenience to the child and the parents, intellectual alterations can be implemented.
What is most disturbing about this is that Foucault noted the foolishness in finding answers through resemblance. Now, parents are able to create answers and children through resemblance. Genetic engineering begs two questions, “Are we regressing structurally through scientific advancement?” and, “Is it human nature to search for likeness?”
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/119/
"Designer Genes"
Bill McKibben
Orion Magazine
May/June 2003
The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences
Michel Foucault
Vintage Books, Random House
New York, New York
1970
So why is it, that now, in some sort of age beyond resemblance—perhaps representation, perhaps not— an article in a magazine has to discuss something like Genetic Engineering, a process which creates children in the image or likeness of something else? Have humans not moved beyond the age of resemblance? It seems humans have not, and while this is not shocking to Foucault, who characterized the shift from episteme to episteme with a sort of awareness of all preexisting historical memoir, it is somewhat shocking to see just how resemblance has appeared in contemporary culture.
Bill McKibben explained the process of Genetic Engineering in his article, “Designer Genes” for Orion Magazine, and within it, he illuminated the harsh reality of what genetic engineering instigates. Through genetic engineering, parents decide what traits a child should have-- what person they should resemble, what ways of being they should emulate. Whereas humans before used resemblance to understand what is going on in the world, humans now are using resemblance to control what is going on in the world. It is in this use of control that resemblance is so controversial concerning genetic enginnering. McKibben writes:
“The vision of genetic engineers is to do to humans what we have already done to salmon and wheat, pine trees and tomatoes. That is, to make them better in some way; to delete, modify, or add genes in developing embryos so that the cells of the resulting person will produce proteins that make them taller and more muscular, or smarter and less aggressive, maybe handsome and possibly straight. Even happy. As early as 1993, a March of Dimes poll found that forty- three percent of Americans would engage in genetic engineering “simply to enhance their children’s looks or intelligence.””
Those that can genetically alter their child are able to create a human as an amalgam of favorite physical and mental traits so as to emulate a conceived vision of the ultimate child. Because of this unnatural a la carte style conception, it is hard to accept genetic engineering as a natural part of science.
Being frustrated with genetic engineering for its eerie God-like simulation is not the point, though. What is important is the fact that humans continue to live their lives with the similitudes now in an active manner. Specifically, emulation and convenience can be noted. For instance, a child may emulate a specific physical characteristic of a parent based upon the selection of a gene. For convenience sake, a child may be given a gene credited to ivy league students. While a gene may not cause a person to succeed or be beautiful, it may lay the groundwork for these things to occur.
By genetically altering a child, a parent is able to choose what that child emulates and creates a connection “without…proxmity,” (19). In this way, the child could be the mirror (21) of whoever the mother or father selects. For convenience to the child and the parents, intellectual alterations can be implemented.
What is most disturbing about this is that Foucault noted the foolishness in finding answers through resemblance. Now, parents are able to create answers and children through resemblance. Genetic engineering begs two questions, “Are we regressing structurally through scientific advancement?” and, “Is it human nature to search for likeness?”
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/119/
"Designer Genes"
Bill McKibben
Orion Magazine
May/June 2003
The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences
Michel Foucault
Vintage Books, Random House
New York, New York
1970
Explaining Violence in Sociology
In light of class discussion and current events, it seems only pertinent to examine the massacre at Virginia Teach in the realm of philosophical analysis. After reading Sharon Begley’s “Anatomy of Violence,” from Newsweek, April 20, 2007, Garfinkel’s elaborate description of explanatory frames and the questions and answers they permit in the complex construction of phenomena were clarified.
Interestingly enough, Begley examines the reasons why a mass killer acts, and in accordance with Garfinkel, she gives multidimensional reasoning for such action. Instead of stating that a gunman would act based on a gene which induces aggression, she stated that such genes only are definitive in character development if they interact with other influences.
Societal standards, family, friendships, pop culture, governmental laws, and other broad influences are labeled as the root of Begley’s characterization of a killer. She states, “Scientists who study criminal violence—that committed outside of wars and civil conflicts—now believe that its roots are equally planted in biology of an individual, the psychology that reflects the interaction of innate traits and experiences, and the larger culture. No single cause is sufficient, none is deterministic.”
It becomes clear that the question Begley asked was not, “Why do mass murderers shoot people?”—this could be answered substantially based on place and time circumstances, including the weapons used, etc. The question Begley asked to arrive at that answer—the question she asked being derived from the explanatory frame in which the question was possible—must have been, “Why of all people, do these people become mass murderers?”
The answer to this question lies in the structural conditions, which Begley certainly depicts. These structural conditions are liberating, too, in that they limit the possible answers to a question based on the explanatory framework of the structure. Garfinkel states, “These presuppositions radically affect the success and failure of potential explanations and the interrelation of various explanations. Call this explanatory relativity,” (48).
Garfinkel’s plainest example of explanatory relativity in Forms of Explanation is that of student achievement, explaining, “why Mary got an A,” (42). For Garfinkel, this is the wrong question. The right question, much like the question Begley must have asked to have arrived at her conclusion, would have been, “Why of these students did Mary get an A?” Based on the structural conditions of the class, the bell curve, a distribution of grades, etc., Mary attains her grade. Similarly, the mass murderer is created—through the presuppositions and structural conditions of specific life experience based upon biology, psychology, and culture.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
“The Anatomy of Violence”
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
Monday, April 30, 2007
Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Alan Garfinkel
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut and London, England
1981
Interestingly enough, Begley examines the reasons why a mass killer acts, and in accordance with Garfinkel, she gives multidimensional reasoning for such action. Instead of stating that a gunman would act based on a gene which induces aggression, she stated that such genes only are definitive in character development if they interact with other influences.
Societal standards, family, friendships, pop culture, governmental laws, and other broad influences are labeled as the root of Begley’s characterization of a killer. She states, “Scientists who study criminal violence—that committed outside of wars and civil conflicts—now believe that its roots are equally planted in biology of an individual, the psychology that reflects the interaction of innate traits and experiences, and the larger culture. No single cause is sufficient, none is deterministic.”
It becomes clear that the question Begley asked was not, “Why do mass murderers shoot people?”—this could be answered substantially based on place and time circumstances, including the weapons used, etc. The question Begley asked to arrive at that answer—the question she asked being derived from the explanatory frame in which the question was possible—must have been, “Why of all people, do these people become mass murderers?”
The answer to this question lies in the structural conditions, which Begley certainly depicts. These structural conditions are liberating, too, in that they limit the possible answers to a question based on the explanatory framework of the structure. Garfinkel states, “These presuppositions radically affect the success and failure of potential explanations and the interrelation of various explanations. Call this explanatory relativity,” (48).
Garfinkel’s plainest example of explanatory relativity in Forms of Explanation is that of student achievement, explaining, “why Mary got an A,” (42). For Garfinkel, this is the wrong question. The right question, much like the question Begley must have asked to have arrived at her conclusion, would have been, “Why of these students did Mary get an A?” Based on the structural conditions of the class, the bell curve, a distribution of grades, etc., Mary attains her grade. Similarly, the mass murderer is created—through the presuppositions and structural conditions of specific life experience based upon biology, psychology, and culture.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
“The Anatomy of Violence”
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
Monday, April 30, 2007
Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Alan Garfinkel
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut and London, England
1981
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Childhood Bipolar Disorder and Questioning
The article “What’s Normal?” by Jerome Goodman in The New Yorker on April 9, 2007 opens a discussion of Alan Garfinkel’s Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory. It is interesting to predict how Garfinkel would react to the information presented in the article.
Goodman writes on bipolar disorder in children, examining its controversial place in current psychology and how this place of conflict has developed. He explains the difficulties in identifying the disorder in children—- children are generally more unruly and harder to read from the ages of infancy to preteen than from adolescence through adulthood.
Because of this, for a long time, bipolar disorder was not considered for children, and many children of the late 80’s and 90’s who had behavioral problems were diagnosed with ADD or ADHD and then were labeled with bipolar disorder in adolescence. The question raised by this trend is whether or not so many children actually had ADHD or if they actually faced bipolar disorder from youth.
Depending on the psychologist, the willingness to accept a child case of bipolar disorder as legitimate varies. Some endorse the possibility, others refute it; some diagnose it, some refuse. Goodman points out that there are major discrepancies in psychology as a whole due to this conflict.
In terms of Garfinkel, there is a pertinent discussion. Garfinkel would raise questions not having to do with psychology specifically; he would hope to find exactly the right questions to ask for a clear understanding of why a child is suffering or behaving in a certain way. He would not be so concerned with revolutionizing psychology or the standards of bipolar disorder, but with examining a case thoroughly enough to find accurate explanations.
Garfinkel would most likely introduce the problem of defining bipolar disorder as part of its explanatory frame. Because Garfinkel encourages questioning like, “…there are nine planets. Why is this so?” (7), one might expect him to ask something like, “These are the symptoms of bipolar disorder. Why is this so?”
Of course, as Garfinkel goes on to say on page 7 about the nine planets, "It turns out that there is no nontrivial explanation. Modern science rejects the idea pf explaining that sort of thing, except by the trivial statement that that is how many there turned out to be." Similarly, modern science explains the symptoms of bipolar disorder as symptoms because they have been chosen as the explanatory framework of the disorder. Because these symptoms are the explanations permitted in modern science's contrast space as “the object to be explained,” (7), it becomes clear that bipolar disorder is not the issue determining whether or not someone has bipolar disorder, but the behavior indicative of the disorder.
Garfinkel explains the basis of questioning for Newtown's law of motion on page 8 in this way:
"...the "explanation" he did offer was peculiar: he said things do not need anything to keep moving, and hence that the question was mistaken. An object in motion just tends to remain in motion unless acted on by an outside force. In a certain way, this is trivial. Not as scientific advance, for it was a major scientific breakthough, but trivial as an answer to the question "Why does the object keep moving?" For it says, in effect, "It just keeps moving." Newtown rejected the question and by doing so rejected the forces that the midievals had postulated."
From this, the following becomes clear: Garfinkel would be most concerned with why the patient is the way he or she is rather than what the exact symptoms are of the disorder. Just as Garfinkel recognizes Newton's strength for rejecting questions within the contrast space of science of that time period, he might also praise the psychologists able to reorder the questioning of bipolar disorder according to the children themselves rather than their age. On top of this, sufficient explanations would only be so for Garfinkel if they directly answered why. Roundabout rationalizations would not satisfy him.
Therefore, it seems that Garfinkel would react in the following way to the conflicts facing bipolar disorder identification in children:
*If the patient, no matter the age, fit the specific framework for bipolar disorder, it seems that Garfinkel would not argue the diagnosis. If age were specific criteria under bipolar disorder as an explanatory frame, however, he might hesitate.*
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
"What's Normal?"
Jerome Goodman
The New Yorker
April 9, 2007
Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Alan Garfinkel
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut and London, England
1981
Goodman writes on bipolar disorder in children, examining its controversial place in current psychology and how this place of conflict has developed. He explains the difficulties in identifying the disorder in children—- children are generally more unruly and harder to read from the ages of infancy to preteen than from adolescence through adulthood.
Because of this, for a long time, bipolar disorder was not considered for children, and many children of the late 80’s and 90’s who had behavioral problems were diagnosed with ADD or ADHD and then were labeled with bipolar disorder in adolescence. The question raised by this trend is whether or not so many children actually had ADHD or if they actually faced bipolar disorder from youth.
Depending on the psychologist, the willingness to accept a child case of bipolar disorder as legitimate varies. Some endorse the possibility, others refute it; some diagnose it, some refuse. Goodman points out that there are major discrepancies in psychology as a whole due to this conflict.
In terms of Garfinkel, there is a pertinent discussion. Garfinkel would raise questions not having to do with psychology specifically; he would hope to find exactly the right questions to ask for a clear understanding of why a child is suffering or behaving in a certain way. He would not be so concerned with revolutionizing psychology or the standards of bipolar disorder, but with examining a case thoroughly enough to find accurate explanations.
Garfinkel would most likely introduce the problem of defining bipolar disorder as part of its explanatory frame. Because Garfinkel encourages questioning like, “…there are nine planets. Why is this so?” (7), one might expect him to ask something like, “These are the symptoms of bipolar disorder. Why is this so?”
Of course, as Garfinkel goes on to say on page 7 about the nine planets, "It turns out that there is no nontrivial explanation. Modern science rejects the idea pf explaining that sort of thing, except by the trivial statement that that is how many there turned out to be." Similarly, modern science explains the symptoms of bipolar disorder as symptoms because they have been chosen as the explanatory framework of the disorder. Because these symptoms are the explanations permitted in modern science's contrast space as “the object to be explained,” (7), it becomes clear that bipolar disorder is not the issue determining whether or not someone has bipolar disorder, but the behavior indicative of the disorder.
Garfinkel explains the basis of questioning for Newtown's law of motion on page 8 in this way:
"...the "explanation" he did offer was peculiar: he said things do not need anything to keep moving, and hence that the question was mistaken. An object in motion just tends to remain in motion unless acted on by an outside force. In a certain way, this is trivial. Not as scientific advance, for it was a major scientific breakthough, but trivial as an answer to the question "Why does the object keep moving?" For it says, in effect, "It just keeps moving." Newtown rejected the question and by doing so rejected the forces that the midievals had postulated."
From this, the following becomes clear: Garfinkel would be most concerned with why the patient is the way he or she is rather than what the exact symptoms are of the disorder. Just as Garfinkel recognizes Newton's strength for rejecting questions within the contrast space of science of that time period, he might also praise the psychologists able to reorder the questioning of bipolar disorder according to the children themselves rather than their age. On top of this, sufficient explanations would only be so for Garfinkel if they directly answered why. Roundabout rationalizations would not satisfy him.
Therefore, it seems that Garfinkel would react in the following way to the conflicts facing bipolar disorder identification in children:
*If the patient, no matter the age, fit the specific framework for bipolar disorder, it seems that Garfinkel would not argue the diagnosis. If age were specific criteria under bipolar disorder as an explanatory frame, however, he might hesitate.*
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
"What's Normal?"
Jerome Goodman
The New Yorker
April 9, 2007
Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Alan Garfinkel
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut and London, England
1981
The Evolution of Brain and Science
In reading Sharon Begley’s article in the April 9, 2007 edition of Newsweek, “In Our Messy Reptilian Brains,” I noticed an intelligible parallel between Johns Hopkins University professor David Linden’s description of the human brain in The Accidental Mind and Thomas Kuhn’s descriptions of the socio-scientific mindset of society in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
For Linden, the human mind is, “a weird agglomeration of ad hoc solutions that have accumulated throughout millions of years of evolutionary theory.” Begley elaborates on this, calling the human brain “an iPod built around an eight-track cassette player,” in that the brain takes incoherent snippets and blends them into coherent thoughts and understandings. Begley discusses sight specifically in that each time a person blinks, a short bit of experience is understood, but the brain “[fills] in the gaps of the jerky feed.” In short, the human brain is able to create a finely seamed story despite a jumpy, severed input.
To me, this is much like Kuhn’s descriptions of society’s understandings of science and the bridging from paradigm into new paradigm. Because of the cycle of normal science to crisis to revolution, the societal understanding of science becomes a somewhat historic ands streamlined narrative.
Much like the brain’s ability to smooth the jerkiness of the eye’s conception of existence, so does society amass the understandings of scientific discovery, theory, conflict, proof, and invention. Kuhn states on page 66, “After the discovery had been assimilated, scientists were able to account for a wider range of natural phenomena or to account with greater precision for some of those previously known.” Science is therefore a process which blends new ideas with the old to understand things more clearly.
This is much like Linden’s description of the brain’s ability to blend individual moments of sight into one cohesive understanding. Each new piece adds onto those of the past.
However, Kuhn also insists upon contextual understandings of science in that textbooks fall short of providing an accurate depiction of science as a construction over time because they only focus on arrival points rather than examining the conflicts and revolutions and moments of normal science that led to “facts.” In the same way, it seems that Linden would encourage society to look at the human brain as a piece which has had a past and development rather than strictly defining in its modern state. Science blends in its development, just as the brain blends human understanding and continues to develop itself.
Perhaps, after reading both “In Our Messy Reptilian Brains” and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, it seems relevant to say that as we evolve, so does knowledge.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
"In Our Messy Reptilian Brains"
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
April 9, 2007
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas S. Kuhn
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois and London, England
1962, 1970, 1996
For Linden, the human mind is, “a weird agglomeration of ad hoc solutions that have accumulated throughout millions of years of evolutionary theory.” Begley elaborates on this, calling the human brain “an iPod built around an eight-track cassette player,” in that the brain takes incoherent snippets and blends them into coherent thoughts and understandings. Begley discusses sight specifically in that each time a person blinks, a short bit of experience is understood, but the brain “[fills] in the gaps of the jerky feed.” In short, the human brain is able to create a finely seamed story despite a jumpy, severed input.
To me, this is much like Kuhn’s descriptions of society’s understandings of science and the bridging from paradigm into new paradigm. Because of the cycle of normal science to crisis to revolution, the societal understanding of science becomes a somewhat historic ands streamlined narrative.
Much like the brain’s ability to smooth the jerkiness of the eye’s conception of existence, so does society amass the understandings of scientific discovery, theory, conflict, proof, and invention. Kuhn states on page 66, “After the discovery had been assimilated, scientists were able to account for a wider range of natural phenomena or to account with greater precision for some of those previously known.” Science is therefore a process which blends new ideas with the old to understand things more clearly.
This is much like Linden’s description of the brain’s ability to blend individual moments of sight into one cohesive understanding. Each new piece adds onto those of the past.
However, Kuhn also insists upon contextual understandings of science in that textbooks fall short of providing an accurate depiction of science as a construction over time because they only focus on arrival points rather than examining the conflicts and revolutions and moments of normal science that led to “facts.” In the same way, it seems that Linden would encourage society to look at the human brain as a piece which has had a past and development rather than strictly defining in its modern state. Science blends in its development, just as the brain blends human understanding and continues to develop itself.
Perhaps, after reading both “In Our Messy Reptilian Brains” and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, it seems relevant to say that as we evolve, so does knowledge.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
"In Our Messy Reptilian Brains"
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
April 9, 2007
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas S. Kuhn
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois and London, England
1962, 1970, 1996
Debating The Genome Cancer Atlas
In “This is No Way to Cure Cancer,” by Sharon Begley in the March 26, 2007 edition of Newsweek, Begley supports the argument that a $1.5 million fund for cancer research on tumors is a bad thing because the research is based on the mutations of genomes in a tumor. Begley argues that tumors are not really the problem. Instead, she labels the real problem as metastases or “malignant cells that spread to a vital organ like the brain.”
What I find to be problematic about this idea stems from the fact that metastases originates in the mutations of tumor cells. How is researching the mutation of a tumor then not beneficial? Begley states, “Identifying all the mutations in a tumor is overkill,” but then goes on to say that the Cancer Genome Atlas is flawed because it might not be comprehensive enough. She goes on to say the following:
"It gets worse. Different parts of a tumor can have completely different mutations…Even if the research does lead to new drug cocktails, a doctor will logically choose drugs that target mutations he or she knows are there— that is, in the biopsied part of the tumor—leaving the very different mutations in nonsampled areas free to proliferate."
First Begley says that the research is far too detailed to be beneficial, and then she states that it is far too much of an overview to be beneficial. It seems that Begley poked a hole in her own argument by arguing two points.
Furthermore, how could Begley write that a tumor is “relatively unimportant?” If tumors were unimportant, doctors would not take biopsies or diagnose cancer—yes, malignant cells are the biggest problem, but these malignant cells find their homes in tumors. In fact, malignant cells mutate to be so from within the tumor.
If, as Begley puts it, “Scientists hope they can separate cancer-causing mutations from innocuous ones,” how are they not making strides in the science of mutation identification? By studying the mutations of a tumor, it seems that scientists could catch the signs of malignant mutation so as to make cancerous recognition quicker. If some sort of drug could be developed to prevent this mutation from occurring, perhaps cancer research would be bettered.
Understandably, the issues of funding are relevant to all science. Even Latour addresses the issue in Chapter 4 of Science in Action. Of course, Latour sounds quite enthusiastic about funding outside of the military-industrial complex because it is much more rare and needed. This makes sense insofar as this type of support is rare. Using Latour's graph of "U.S. Federal obligations for research and development in constant 1972 dollars," he answers the question, "What sort of topics drain so much taxpayer's money into industry and the universities?" (171). National Defense held $8 billion to its name, while General Science had under $2 billion, and Health held just about $2 billion. Latour would be grateful for the Genome Atlas research in that it is a part of General Science and Health research. That is not to say that researchers should be grateful for any research done, but that the fact it is being done is a good thing.
This argument follows that if scientists have a better way of isolating the problems of cancer, then they should propose a research project and attempt to take funding away from the Cancer Genome Atlas. In the meantime, be happy that $1.5 million is available to people at all.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
“This is No Way to Cure Cancer”
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
March 26, 2007
"Science in Action"
Bruno Latour
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
1987
What I find to be problematic about this idea stems from the fact that metastases originates in the mutations of tumor cells. How is researching the mutation of a tumor then not beneficial? Begley states, “Identifying all the mutations in a tumor is overkill,” but then goes on to say that the Cancer Genome Atlas is flawed because it might not be comprehensive enough. She goes on to say the following:
"It gets worse. Different parts of a tumor can have completely different mutations…Even if the research does lead to new drug cocktails, a doctor will logically choose drugs that target mutations he or she knows are there— that is, in the biopsied part of the tumor—leaving the very different mutations in nonsampled areas free to proliferate."
First Begley says that the research is far too detailed to be beneficial, and then she states that it is far too much of an overview to be beneficial. It seems that Begley poked a hole in her own argument by arguing two points.
Furthermore, how could Begley write that a tumor is “relatively unimportant?” If tumors were unimportant, doctors would not take biopsies or diagnose cancer—yes, malignant cells are the biggest problem, but these malignant cells find their homes in tumors. In fact, malignant cells mutate to be so from within the tumor.
If, as Begley puts it, “Scientists hope they can separate cancer-causing mutations from innocuous ones,” how are they not making strides in the science of mutation identification? By studying the mutations of a tumor, it seems that scientists could catch the signs of malignant mutation so as to make cancerous recognition quicker. If some sort of drug could be developed to prevent this mutation from occurring, perhaps cancer research would be bettered.
Understandably, the issues of funding are relevant to all science. Even Latour addresses the issue in Chapter 4 of Science in Action. Of course, Latour sounds quite enthusiastic about funding outside of the military-industrial complex because it is much more rare and needed. This makes sense insofar as this type of support is rare. Using Latour's graph of "U.S. Federal obligations for research and development in constant 1972 dollars," he answers the question, "What sort of topics drain so much taxpayer's money into industry and the universities?" (171). National Defense held $8 billion to its name, while General Science had under $2 billion, and Health held just about $2 billion. Latour would be grateful for the Genome Atlas research in that it is a part of General Science and Health research. That is not to say that researchers should be grateful for any research done, but that the fact it is being done is a good thing.
This argument follows that if scientists have a better way of isolating the problems of cancer, then they should propose a research project and attempt to take funding away from the Cancer Genome Atlas. In the meantime, be happy that $1.5 million is available to people at all.
WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
“This is No Way to Cure Cancer”
Sharon Begley
Newsweek
March 26, 2007
"Science in Action"
Bruno Latour
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
1987
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