Locke, Garfinkel, Reason-- Shoot!

Living in America, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is more than just a reading in political philosophy and societal design. It is the hallmark of free market capitalism. Though marked with critique, the Treatise is a stark, obvious document, with clear rationale and an irrefutable use of Enlightenment reason.

Though the time of the Enlightenment has passed, Locke’s premise for economic distribution is still a hot button issue. By examining Alan Garfinkel’s commentary on Locke in Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory, the solidity of Locke’s rationale is illustrated, and it is in this flaw of Garfinkel’s Marxist critique that the importance of his own thoughts on questioning and explanation can be recognized.

Most importantly, Locke begins the Second Treatise of Government with the dissolution of manifest power. He states, “Firstly. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, nor the dominion over the world, as is pretended,” (Locke, 3). This is important when contemplating Lockean theory in contemporary society; Locke does not avow inheritance. He does not tolerate inactivity.

Instead, as he explains in his section on the state of nature, Locke supports attainment through labor. By following the law of nature—not to steal, kill, or enslave another man—one finds peace in the state of nature. If one breaks this law, both parties, the stolen from and the stealing, enter into the state of war, and it is up to the person affronted to punish (4-5).

This follows in Nozick’s notation of the Lockean proviso, that as one labors the land for ownership, there must still be, “as much and as good left in common for others,” (Garfinkel, 81). In the case of the state of nature, taking more than you are able to labor or seizing the worked land of another is stealing. Locke does not condone the breaking of this law, and it is up to each individual in the state of nature to abide by this standard and to enforce it when necessary.

Garfinkel's critique of Locke is not based on Lockean thought, but on modern capitalist society. He begins his argument by refuting the Lockean proviso, Garfinkel states, “If someone’s appropriation of something ends up depriving others in any way, the theory collapses and has nothing to say about possible entitlements,” (81). This critique is problematic because it neglects the cultural presuppositions which have constructed a society where deprivation is permitted.

Garfinkel continues, "If we look at history, we can see why. There is not a shred of hope of applying this original entitlement scheme in any real case," (82). While Garfinkel is free to say that Locke's proviso is based on fantasy because most entitlement is derived from conquest, Locke did not condone that conquest. He asked for a societal structure and a property distribution in which his entitlement scheme worked under governmental supervision. Critiquing Locke for a fantastical societal proposal is the same as calling Marx's wish for a classless society fictitious. The problem with communism is not its plan, but in its application-- human corruption. The same is with Locke. Theoretically, both Marx and Locke are relatively flawless.

Secondly, the actions which Garfinkel associates with Locke are not actions which Locke would avow. Garfinkel distinguishes the faults of American capitalism as having to do with Locke: "Any good history tells the same story about the people who amassed the fortunes of the great families in the United States. John D. Rockefeller had competitors dynamited, Ford had striking workers shot," (83). In civil society, Locke would expect the government to address these violations of his proviso. It does not make his proviso invalid; it makes the American government invalid in its application of Lockean theory. In his description of civil society, Locke describes the specific purpose as to protect the individual rights of others. Locke's government would prosecute Rockefeller. Ford would also have been punished. Lockean theory is only fantastical because the government has not acted as Locke suggests.

However, in Lockean civil society, Locke still does not allow for the stealing of one’s labored land. By joining the commonwealth, each and every member gives up some rights for protection under the government. Specifically, Locke notes the protection of property by joining a commonwealth: “…government has no other end but the preservation of property…” (Locke, 34). In fact, Locke offers a clause to identify just when it is fair to seize property from someone. He reasons, “the supreme power cannot take away from any man any part of his property without his own consent,” (49), and as such, it will be the government’s duty to be sure that the Lockean proviso is sustained in civil matters and in governmental behavior. Unless one consents for something to be taken away, it must not be seized.

In fact, if the Lockean proviso is not abided by, Locke calls for revolution. This is sensibly so, too, for Locke is so concerned with property, that if he allowed for an unrighteous seizing of it, his most beloved entity of human existence would be violated. He reasons:
“The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end while they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to properties of all the society….Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society…it devolves to the people, who have the right to assume their original liberty…” (60).
It becomes clear then that Locke is not passive in his defense of the right of property for each and every member of civil society. Because of Locke’s entitlement theory, he obligates all to work for property, but he never allows for the unrighteous seizure of earned property.

It is in Locke’s well-developed concept of property importance that Garfinkel is beaten at his own game of explanation. However, Garfinkel is right to be concerned with the modern application of Lockean theory for it often neglects Locke’s ultimate concern for governmental protection of property—“one’s life, liberty, and estate,” (31). The Rockefellers and the Fords of America do need to be addressed. It is perhaps that Garfinkel has not looked at the structural presuppositions that have allowed the straying from Lockean principles into modern capitalist mannerisms. He should not attack Locke for his concept, but America for disallowing its application.

If Garfinkel were to broaden his perspective by examining applications, societal demands, and current economic structures internally and externally, etc., Garfinkel could possibly find the exact explanatory framework to point fingers. As for now, he has fallen short. The Lockean proviso is not inadequate because of itself, but because of its inability to be enforced in the American contrast space.



WRITTEN IN REFERENCE TO:
The Second Treatise of Government
from The Temple University Intellectual Heritage 52 Reader
John Locke
Temple University Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
2004

Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory
Alan Garfinkel
Yale University Press
New Haven, Connecticut and London, England
1981